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Abstract
Using a simple model with interdependent utilities, we study how social networks influence
individual voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. Departing from the stan-
dard model of public good provision, we assume that an agents’ utility has two terms: (a)
‘ego’-utility derived from agents consumption of public and private goods, and (b) a social
utility which is the sum of utility spillovers from other agents with whom the agent has social
relationships. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium
and describe the equilibrium in terms of network characteristics. We show that social network
always has a positive effect on the provision of public good. We also find that in networks
with “small world”-like modular structures, ‘bridging’ ties connecting distant parts of social
network play important role inducing agents’ contribution to public good. Assumptions and
results of the model are discussed in relation to the role of social capital in community-level
development projects and to the effect of innovation networks on firms’ R&D investments.
1 Introduction
Our interest in studying the relationship between structure of social networks and
private provision of a public good is motivated by two economic contexts.
First, in development studies, social capital is believed to be an important
factor in enabling action by individual members of a community. In community-
driven development, an increasing number of field studies have found social capital
to be a statistically significant predictor of provision/absence of community-level
public services. For example, Pargal et al. (2002) studied establishment of voluntary
solid waste management systems in Bangladesh and found that it is more likely to be
undertaken in neighbourhoods with higher levels of social capital (note that the level
of social capital is a function of the structure of the local social network). Similar
effects of social capital were reported by Isham and Ka¨hko¨nen (2002) on community-
based water projects in Indonesia and by Motiram and Osberg (2010) on household
access to drinking water in India. This widespread evidence suggests that different
levels of social capital, based on different network structures, may afford different
potentials with respect to action for establishing a community public service.
The other context motivating our interest in the effect of network structure on
production of public goods comes from economics of innovation. It has long been
recognized that knowledge has characteristics of a public good and therefore, the ar-
gument goes, when production of knowledge relies on private voluntary contributions
(for example firms’ investments in R&D), knowledge is under-produced as compared
to the social optimum (Arrow, 1962). However, specific features of knowledge make
the problem of knowledge production, in some key aspects, different from the stan-
dard problem with public goods.
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First, important part of firms’ knowledge generated through their own R&D ac-
tivities remains tacit and held by the firms’ knowledge employees. Unlike explicit or
codified part of knowledge, this tacit knowledge, often tied in with the firms’ own
technological activities, does not flow freely into the public domain. Instead, it may
spillover to other firms through the network of interfirm interactions such as a net-
work of R&D alliances, a network of co-inventors, or a buyer-supplier network. As
highlighted by the extensive literature on proximity and innovation (e.g. Boschma,
2010; Balland, 2012), spillovers of tacit knowledge are most effective between firms
that are cognitively proximate (in their knowledge bases). Such cognitive proximity
may be developed by tapping into and utilizing the same pool of generally-available
public knowledge.
Further, this ‘global’ public knowledge (that may be more readily available as
codified) may be complementary to firms’ own knowledge generated through R&D (a
large part of which may be ‘sticky’ or tacit and thereby remaining within the firm and
its local network). Such complementarity rests on the observation that firms’ abilities
to assimilate public knowledge and put it to use depend on the firms’ absorptive
capacities, which can only be accumulated by carrying out their own R&D activities
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). In addition, this complementarity between public and
private knowledge renders pure free-riding strategy impractical, it stimulates firms’
own investment in R&D, and therefore mitigates the problem of underproduction
of public knowledge. The absorptive capacity argument suggests that the stock of
public knowledge, and the desire to absorb it within the firm, is an important factor
in driving firms’ willingness to invest in R&D.
This interplay between the global-public and local-private types of knowledge
implies that a firm may face a trade-off between investing in the production of public
knowledge and in the production of private knowledge. Negotiation of this trade-
off may require that a firm has to take into account how its investment in global-
public knowledge, besides the direct effect on its own R&D capabilities, stimulates
other firms in an industry or a region to conduct research in technological domains
that may be complementary (or similar) to its own. Knowledge generated through
research by others may later spill over back to the focal firm through the global inter-
firm network of the entire industry or region. On the other hand, the focal firm’s
R&D investment in the development of its own specific technological domain is more
likely to have an effect on complementary R&D activities of the firms with which it
has direct connections. The latter local knowledge is then likely to be of immediate
relevance to the focal firm and its network of directly connected firms. In contrast, the
global-public knowledge is likely to have general relevance, akin to a general-purpose
technology (David, 1990; Gambardella and McGahan, 2010), which can be accessed
by other firms in the entire network for further development, thereby generating
global spillovers. The balance in this trade-off between investing in general/global
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and specific/local knowledge depends on the stock of public knowledge, structure of
the global knowledge network and firm’s own position in this network.
In both contexts (social capital in community development and knowledge spillovers
for innovation), network structure is likely to play an important role in determining
individual decisions to contribute to the provision of a public good. In this paper,
we employ a formal model to examine this influence of the network structure. Our
model differs from other models of public goods on networks in several aspects.
First, our model is a model of interrelated utilities. The payoff to an agent may
‘spill over’ to another agent if the two are engaged in a social relationship. Therefore
one’s motivation to invest in a public good, in addition to the direct effect on one’s
own utility, lies in the increase of the well-being of other agents for whom one cares.
Second, public good in our model is global i.e. available to all. Consistent with the
two economic contexts mentioned above, the public good is provided on the level of
the whole population. Third, besides the global public good there is a private good
which, as we shall see, due to utility spillovers is akin to a local public good and the
global and local goods are complementary. Thus our model can also be seen as a
network game with interplay between global and local public goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews recent literature on models
with public goods on networks. Section 3 introduce the model and presents private
equilibrium allocations of public good. Section 4 discusses the relationship with earlier
works. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Literature
Our model is related to two streams in economic literature. First, and directly related
to our model, is the literature on network games. The recent decade has seen a surge
of interest in network games including network games with public goods. Given
the large and ever increasing number of studies in this field, we limit ourselves to
reviewing only a few seminal works. For a comprehensive survey of recent advances
on network games we refer the reader to Jackson and Zenou (2014).
Ballester et al. (2006) analysed a general network game with linear-quadratic pay-
offs such that the marginal utility of agent’s own action, while diminishing in her own
action, linearly depends on the actions of her neighbours. They show that this game
has a unique interior Nash equilibrium in which agents’ actions are proportional to
their Bonacich centrality scores.1 This striking result is significant because it bridges
the gap between emerging economic research on network games and the established
theory of social networks in the social sciences.
1Bonacich centrality is a measure used in social network analysis to describe the power and importance
of an actor in a social network.
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Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007) proposed a model of local public goods with spillovers.
In their model agents are distributed across a fixed number of separate jurisdictions.
Agents divide their income between consumption of a private good and contribution
to the provision of a local public good. Utility of an agent depends on her consump-
tion of private good and the total amount of public good, which is equal to the sum of
local public good produced in the jurisdiction and spillovers of public goods produced
in other jurisdictions (all local public goods are perfect substitutes). The matrix of
spillover intensities describes the structure of spillovers between jurisdictions. Bloch
and Zenginobuz (2007) find that when the intensity of spillovers is relatively low (all
row sums of spillovers matrix are less than one), the equilibrium level of public good
is unique and increasing intensity of spillovers results in multiple equilibria. They
also find that a jurisdiction that is more central (and therefore benefits more from
public goods produced in other jurisdictions) contributes less public good.
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) examined a different public good game on a net-
work. In their model agents have to make a decision about costly investment in a
public good. This public good is local and an agent’s payoff is a function of the
sum of an agent’s own contribution and the contributions of her direct neighbours.
This game has two types of equilibria: specialized and hybrid ones. In a specialized
equilibrium some agents invest in public goods while others choose not to invest but
free-ride on contributions of their neighbours. Such specialization is socially optimal
in a configuration in which contributors are linked to many non-contributors. Inter-
estingly, a new link may reduce social welfare because it may reduce agent’s incentive
to contribute.
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) unified and extended the results of Bramoulle´ and Kran-
ton (2007) and Ballester et al. (2006). They developed a general approach to analyse
games with strategic substitutes with linear best reply functions based on the theory
of potential games and therefore encompass earlier works on network games men-
tioned above. They show that in games with linear best reply functions, it is the
lowest eigenvalue of the interaction matrix that defines certain properties of the Nash
equilibria such as uniqueness, number of contributors and stability. Under the spec-
ifications of the model that we study in extent in this paper, just as in Bramoulle´
et al. (2014) model, agents’ best reply functions are linear and therefore the results
obtained by Bramoulle´ et al. must also hold.
The second stream of literature on which we base our model concerns systems of
altruistic utility functions (Becker, 1976; Bergstrom, 1999). In this literature con-
nections between agents are defined as interdependence between agents’ utilities. In
network games such as those discussed above, a social network is essentially the net-
work of effects of one agent’s action on payoffs of the agents with whom the agent is
connected. In the literature on interdependent utilities the network accounts for the
effects of one agent’s payoff on the payoffs of her direct neighbours. Most research in
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this tradition concerns with some general properties of systems or models in which
the network structure of interactions plays no significant role such as systems of two
individuals or systems with a special pattern of interactions.2 Notwithstanding the
lack of interest in structure of interrelated utilities in this literature, some results
on systems with general patterns of interactions are also useful, as in the model we
develop in the next section.
Bergstrom (1999) studied systems of altruistic individuals and has shown that un-
der certain conditions a system of interdependent utility functions can be disentangled
into a system of independent utility functions which define individual preferences over
the set of possible allocations of individual consumption bundles. Ley (1997) studied
the optimal provision of public goods in the context of a additively separable altru-
istic utility functions. In his model, an agent receives spillovers from the utilities of
other individuals with whom she has social ties. Perhaps surprisingly, he found that
the Samuelson condition for optimal allocation in a model without interactions also
holds in a model with interdependent utility functions.3
Finally, in a recent study Bourle`s and Bramoulle´ (2013) analysed a transfer game
on a network defined in terms of interdependencies between agents’ utility functions.
They find that for any network and any utility functions there is a unique profile of
equilibrium incomes. However on generic network equilibria are multiple, except on
trees.
Our model, motivated by the two economic contexts discussed in the introduc-
tion is closely related to the both streams of economic literature discussed above.
Following studies on systems of altruistic utilities, we analyse a population of agents
woven into a network of social relationships where the utility of an agent depends
on utilities of the other agents with whom she has direct relationships. And simi-
lar to network games we are interested in equilibrium outcomes and the relationship
between network structure and equilibrium level of a public good.
Our model is different from other models of public goods on networks in several
respects. First, in contrast to other network games with public goods, our networks
are networks of interrelated utilities. Our interpretation of social relationships is
similar to the traditional notion of close relationships between individuals adopted in
the social sciences (Wellman, 1979), which refers to feelings and sentiment based on
reciprocity and mutual care generally found in social networks of kinship, friendship
and social affinity. It may also be useful in case of networks other than social networks,
such as knowledge networks, where it is reasonable to assume that the interactions
2Examples of such systems include systems of utilities in which individuals care equally for all other
individuals and systems with a fixed pattern of interactions e.g. Bergstrom (1999) examine a model where
agents are located on a line and each agent is connected to exactly one agent on the right and one agent
on the left (this system of utility functions can be used in the framework of overlapping generations to
account for intergenerational altruism.
3Also see Bergstrom (2006).
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take the form of payoff spillovers from alter to ego rather than a direct effect of alter ’s
actions one ego’s payoff.
Second, in our model agents make contributions to public good that are global
i.e. provided on the level of the whole population. In this respect it is different from
most other models where public goods are local, i.e. accessible only by agent’s direct
neighbours. This makes it consistent with the two economic contexts mentioned in
the introduction, because both community-level public services and public knowledge
are in principle accessible by all members of a community.
Third, because of payoff spillovers, the private good, complementary to the global
public good in our model, is in fact a kind of a local public good (Ley, 1997). Thus
our model can be seen as a model with global and local public goods with some
level of complementarity between the two. In the context of R&D networks it may
correspond to a firm’s investment in building its own absorptive capacities, which
increases the value of public knowledge to the firm.
3 Model
There are n agents in the economy. Each agent indexed by i ∈ {1, .., n} has en-
dowment wi = 1 which she divides between consumption of private good, xi, and a
contribution to public good, yi. The marginal rate of transformation between private
and public good is 1, and the amount of public good provision is simply a sum of
contributions of all agents, Y = y1 + ..+ yn.
Agent i’s utility, Vi, is sum of two terms. The ego part Ui, henceforth referred
as ego-utility, is a function of consumption of private good, xi, and consumption of
public good, Y . Throughout the paper we use ego utility functions
Ui(xi, Y ) = v(Y )xi, (1)
where v(·) is a CRRA or isoelastic utility function. These functions belong to a special
class of quasi-concave utility functions Ui = v(Y )x + ui(Y ) that generate economies
with transferable private utilities (Bergstrom and Cornes, 1983) and has been used
earlier in models with systems of altruistic preferences (Ley, 1997; Bergstrom, 2006).4
It is also important for us that with this specification we obtain best-reply functions
similar to ones in other network games discussed in the previous section.
The alter part of Vi is sum of utility “spillovers” from the agents with whom agent
4Ley (1997) has shown that in a system of interrelated utilities such as (2) Pareto efficiency of an
allocation is independent of the distribution of private consumption. However this result concerns only for
the flat part of the utility possibility frontiers, because his analysis exclude corner solutions.
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i has direct connections
Vi = Ui(xi, Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ego
+
∑
j 6=i
αijVj︸ ︷︷ ︸
alter
. (2)
Social relationships channelling utility spillovers constitute a weighted undirected
network g with adjacency matrix A = ‖αij‖. We assume that utility spillovers are
non-negative (αij ≥ 0). Equation (2) can be rewritten in matrix form as
v = u + Av, or u = (I−A)v
where I is the identity matrix and v = (V1, V2, .., Vn) and u = (U1, U2, .., Un) are the
vectors of agents’ overall utilities and ego-utilities respectively.
3.1 Systems of interrelated utility functions
Systems of additively separable utility functions have been studied in Bergstrom
(1999) and Ley (1997). Bergstrom (1999) has shown that a system of interdependent
utility functions (2) can be disentangled to induce a unique well-behaved, or “normally
benevolent”, system of independent utility functions when matrix (I−A) is dominant
diagonal. Matrix of form (I −A), where A ≥ 0, is said to be dominant diagonal if
its row sums are all positive, i.e.
n∑
j=1
αij < 1, for any i ∈ {1, .., n}. (3)
A dominant diagonal matrix is invertible and the elements of the inverse matrix
are non-negative. When the adjacency matrix A satisfies (3), by inverting matrix
equation (2) we can obtain
v = Bu, where B = (I−A)−1. (4)
A system of utility function is said to be normally benevolent when an agent is never
worse off from other agent being better off (Bergstrom, 1999). When matrix (I−A) is
dominant diagonal, the system of utility functions (4) is normally benevolent, because
elements of B are non-negative.
Matrix B has particular meaning in social network theory.5 Its elements can be
interpreted as a measure of influence that one individual exerts on another. Notice
5Matrices of form (I−A) and their inverse are well-known to economists in the context of input-output
analysis. Matrix B = (I −A)−1, where A is a matrix of technical coefficients is a Leontief inverse that
describes the relationship between vector of sector outputs and final demands. When network defined by
adjacency matrix A is strongly connected a diagonally dominant matrix (I−A) is an M-matrix (Horn and
Johnson, 1994, p.131)
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that (I−A)−1 can be decomposed into a series of matrix powers of A: B = ∑∞t=0 At.
The element ij of matrix At counts the number of walks from i to j of length t
discounted by the product of the edge weights along the walk. Thus Bij sums up all
walks which start at i and end at j with appropriate weights (e.g. Ballester et al.
2006; Elliott and Golub 2013). The vector of row sums of matrix B, known as vector
of Bonacich centralities, characterizes agents’ influence or power over the network.
We may interpret Bij in terms of utility flows: well-being of agent i spills over
to i’s neighbours (the intensity of spillover is proportional to the strength of social
relationships) and then to neighbours of neighbours and so on. The coefficient Bij
counts for total utility flow passing all walks connecting i to j and therefore it traces
the total effect of an increase in utility of agent i on the utility of j channelled through
the social network.
The diagonal element Bii corresponds to the part of the ‘well-being flow’ which
returns to i: an increase in i’s utility (e.g. due to increase in private consumption)
spills over to i’s neighbours increasing their utilities, but increasing their utilities,
in turn, spills over back to i. The Bii sums up the direct effect (equal to 1), the
effect of neighbours described above and all effects of higher order due to neighbours
of neighbours and so on. In general, the magnitude of Bii is larger when there are
many paths starting and ending in i, which depends on the size of i’s network and
its density, hence Bii is a measure of i’s embeddedness in the network.
3.2 Best-reply functions
The system (4) defines agents’ preferences over different allocations x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
Agent i maximizes her utility Vi by choosing xi given the vector of choices of all other
agents x−i. Her optimization problem is
max
xi
Vi(xi, Y ) =
n∑
j=1
BijUj(xj , Y ) (5)
subject to Y = W − (xi + x−i),
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1.
The first order condition for this optimization problem is
dVi
dxi
=
∂Vi
∂xi
− ∂Vi
∂Y
= Bii
∂Ui(xi, Y )
∂xi
−
n∑
j=1
Bij
∂Uj
∂Y
= 0
or
Bii
∂Ui(xi, Y )
∂xi
=
n∑
j=1
Bij
∂Uj(xj , Y )
∂Y
(6)
when xi ∈ (0, 1). In addition, an agent’s budget constraint defines two possible corner
8
solutions
Bii
∂Ui(xi, Y )
∂xi
>
n∑
j=1
Bij
∂Uj(xj , Y )
∂Y
, xi = 1;
Bii
∂Ui(xi, Y )
∂xi
<
n∑
j=1
Bij
∂Uj(xj , Y )
∂Y
, xi = 0.
The LHS of equation (6) and the inequalities above represents the marginal utility of
consuming the of private good. The factor Bii accounts for the sum of direct effect
of private consumption on ego-utility Ui and the return (‘circular’) utility spillovers.
Similarly, factors Bij in the RHS of the equation describe the effect of an increase in
j’s utility on the utility of agent i. The RHS of the equation (6) sums up utility flows
from all other agents and stands for the marginal effect of i’s investment in public
good on her utility.
Assuming that ego-utility functions are quasi-concave in the form of (1) the solu-
tion to the optimization problem (6) can be written in a closed form. The first order
condition (6) is
v(Y )Bii =
n∑
j=1
Bijxjv
′(Y ), (7)
for xi ∈ (0, 1), or
Y
y
=
n∑
j=1
Bij
Bii
xj .
Considering that the elasticity of CRRA function v(Y ) is a constant, y(Y ) = , and
Y = W − (x1 + · · ·+ xi) where W = n is the sum of agents’ endowments we obtain
(1 + )xi = W −
∑
j 6=i
(
1 + 
Bij
Bii
)
xj
Finally, the best reply function of agent i is
BRi(x−i) =

0, if W <
∑
j 6=i
(
1 + 
Bij
Bii
)
xj ;
1, if W >
∑
j 6=i
(
1 + 
Bij
Bii
)
xj + (1 + );
1
1+
(
W −∑j 6=i (1 + BijBii )xj) , otherwise.
(8)
Notice that agents’ best reply functions are linear in actions of the others. For
properly defined x˜ and B˜ we can re-write BRi as
BRi(x) = min{1,max{0, x˜− B˜x}}.
Therefore our model belongs to the class of the network games studied in Bramoulle´
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et al. (2014)6 and their results concerning existence and stability of Nash equilibria
must hold for our model. However, following the approach of Bramoulle´ et al. (2014),
we would have to re-formulate our model in terms of the network induced by matrix
B˜, which lacks a straightforward intuitive interpretation with respect to the original
social network. The criteria for existence and stability of equilibria in the game would
also be formulated in terms of eigenvalues of B˜. Thus instead of relying on the general
results of Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), we establish conditions and prove existence and
uniqueness of internal equilibrium in our model by solving the system of first order
conditions (7). In this way we obtain the equilibrium allocation x in a closed form
and can describe the equilibrium in terms of the original network (matrices A and
B).
3.3 Equilibrium
We focus on the interior equilibrium in our model i.e. the equilibrium where agents’
budget constraints (0 ≤ xi ≤ 1) are not binding and agents’ first order conditions are
as given by equation (7). Define vector χ as
χi = Bii −
n∑
i=1
AijBjj
or in matrix form
χ = (I−A)b,
where b = (B11, B22, . . . Bnn, ), and let χ¯ be the average of χi over i = 1, . . . , n. The
following proposition establishes conditions for existence of the interior equilibrium
and describes how agents’ actions in equilibrium depend on their positions in the
network.
Proposition 1. If for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: χi ≥ 0 and (χi − χ¯) ≤ n , then there is a
unique interior equilibrium x∗ = {x∗1, . . . , x∗n}:
x∗i =
χi
χ¯+ /n
and 0 ≤ x∗i ≤ 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . n}.
Proof. Assuming that agents’ budget constraints are not binding the system of first
order conditions (7) defining the internal equilibrium can be written in a matrix form
as
b = Bz, (9)
where b = diag(B) is the vector of diagonal elements of matrix B and z is the vector
6The general version of their model with heterogeneous payoff impacts and upper bound on agents’
actions (Bramoulle´ et al., 2014, p.919).
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of agents’ marginal rates of substitution: zi =
v′(Y )xi
v(Y ) . Inversion of this equation (B
is non-singular) gives us
z = (I−A)b ≡ χ,
and using definition of zi we have
xi =
v(Y )
v′(Y )
χi,
i.e. in equilibrium consumption of private good xi is proportional to χi.
To find the equilibrium level of xi we only need to determine the level of public
good in equilibrium, Y ∗. Summing up xi we obtain
X∗ =
v(Y )
v′(Y )
∑
i,j
χi
where X∗ = (x∗1 + · · · + x∗n) is the total consumption of private good. Taking into
account the balance condition: Y = (W − X), where W = n is the sum of agents
endowments, and the fact that for CRRA utility function v(Y ): v(Y )/v′(Y ) = Y/
this equation can be written as
n− Y ∗ = Y
∗

∑
i,j
χi,
solving which we find the equilibrium level of public good
Y ∗ =
1
χ¯/+ 1/n
, (10)
and, finally,
x∗i =
Y ∗

χi =
χi
χ¯+ /n
.
It is straightforward to verify that the conditions of the proposition ensure that the
equilibrium consumption of private good defined by the expression above respects
budget constraint 0 ≤ x∗i ≤ 1. Therefore x∗ defines an interior equilibrium. By its
very construction, this equilibrium is unique because the system of linear equations
b = Bz has a unique solution. 
Notice that the structural properties of the social network enters into the agents’
actions through χ. Vector χ plays an important role in describing the equilibrium in
our model: equilibrium vector of agent’s private consumption x∗ is a multiple of χ,
while average χ¯ determines the equilibrium level of public good.
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4 Discussion
There are two opposite effects of a social network on an agent’s incentives to con-
tribute to public good, as can be inferred from (6). On the one hand, the social
network lets the agent internalize part of the social benefit due to her investment
in the public good. Contribution to the public good raises the well-being of every
individual and the network channels the increases in other agents’ utilities to the
contributing agent. As a result, the marginal utility of the public good on an agent’s
utility (∂Vi/∂Y ) is larger than the marginal effect of the public good on the agent’s
ego-utility (∂Ui/∂Y ). The magnitude of this effect depends on the coefficients Bij ,
that measure how well is agent i connected to the others, according to the RHS of
equation (6).
On the other hand, social network also amplifies the effect of consumption of
private good. An increment to an agent’s ego-utility due to more consumption of
the private good spills over to the agent’s direct neighbours increasing their utility.
This, in turn, enhances utilities of the neighbours of the agent’s neighbours and the
process goes on. Thus, the private good in the model is, in fact, a kind of local public
good. Part of the utility flow initiated by an agent’s consumption of the private good
returns to the agent. This accrues to the marginal effect of private consumption,
and therefore we have factor Bii in the LHS of (6) which stands for the intensity of
returning utility spillovers (or ‘self-effect’).
In this section we examine properties of the equilibrium in our model. First, we
show that for any agent the ‘global’ positive effect of social network on provision of
public good always prevails over the negative ‘local’ effect, i.e. the social network
encourages the agent’s investment in public good. We also show that despite the
positive effect of the social network in equilibrium, the public good is under-produced.
Second, we examine the impact of network structure on provision of public good. We
focus on small-world modular networks and using some numerical examples we show
the importance of social ties spanning across groups of densely connected agents.
4.1 Equilibrium and social optimum
Below we analyse Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium defined by Proposition 1 (section
3.3). We start by comparison with a standard model of public good, where there is
no social network (A = 0) and therefore no utility spillovers (B = I), which may
serve as a useful benchmark. Our interest in such settings, which we refer to as an
egoistic society, owes to the result of Ley (1997) on the relationship between Pareto
efficient allocations in egoistic society and socially optimal allocations in a model with
interrelated utilities.
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Social optimum in egoistic society In a standard public good model a socially
optimal allocation of private consumption, xˆe, must satisfy Samuelson’s condition:
n∑
j=1
zj(xˆ
e
i , Yˆ
e) = 1,
where zj is agent j’s marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods.
However if the production of a public good relies on agents’ voluntary contribu-
tions then the level of public good in the economy is lower than socially optimal
because agents are only willing to contribute yei = (wi − xei ) such that an agent’s
marginal rate of substitution between consumption of private and public goods is
equal to 1.7 Under this condition, an agent’s first order condition is
zi(x
e
i , Y
e) = 1.
Consequently, agents’ marginal rates of substitution sum up to n rather than 1, as
is required by Samuelson’s condition. Thus in an egoistic society where provision of
public good depends on voluntary contributions of agents, the public good is always
underproduced: Y e < Yˆ e.
Egoistic society vs. social network In our model, the social network allows
an agent to internalize the positive externality resulting from her investment in public
good and therefore the agent’s contribution to public good is larger than in an egoistic
society. In the equilibrium defined by (9) the marginal rate of substitution of agent
i is
zi =
1−∑
j 6=i
Bij
Bii
zj
 < 1.
i.e. social network lowers agents’ marginal rates of substitution. Since the rate of
marginal substitution of public good Y for agent’s consumption of private good xi is
diminishing with Y (for any reasonable utility functions including the chosen quasi-
concave utilities) it implies that
Lemma 1. Networks of social relationships encourage investment in public good;
agents contribute to provision of public good more than they would do if there was no
social network.
However agents do not internalize the positive externalities of their investment in
the public good fully and therefore the sum of agents’ contributions in equilibrium
will never reach the optimum level Yˆ e defined by Samuelson’s condition.
7By assumption the marginal rate of transformation between private and public goods is equal to 1.
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Lemma 2. The equilibrium level of public good, Y ∗, does not reach the socially
optimal level of public good in the egoistic society, Yˆ e: Y ∗ < Yˆ e
Proof. Indeed, if we divide (7) by its LHS, we notice that
1 =
n∑
j=1
Bij
Bii
zj <
n∑
j=1
zj (11)
where we use the fact that for strictly diagonally dominant A, the diagonal elements of
its inverse are always larger than its off-diagonal elements i.e. Bii > Bij for any j 6= i
(Horn and Johnson, 1994, Theorem 2.5.12). Since the sum of agents’ marginal rates
of substitution is larger than 1 (required by Samuelson’s condition), in the private
equilibrium the level of the public good (Y ∗) is always below the socially optimal
Yˆ e. 
Social efficiency of equilibrium allocation Ley (1997) has shown that a
Pareto efficient allocation in a model with interrelated utilities is also a Pareto efficient
allocation in egoistic society. Furthermore he has found that for quasi-concave ego-
utility functions all Pareto efficient allocations have the same level of public good.
Given his result analysis of (in)efficiency of the equilibrium in our model could have
been reduced to testing whether our equilibrium satisfies Samuelson’s condition of the
standard model (according to Lemma 2 it does not). However Ley’s result does not
apply to all Pareto efficient allocations, but concerns only allocations where agents’
budget constraints are not binding i.e., xi < 1 for any i ∈ {1, .., n}. We proceed as
follows. First, we find a Pareto efficient allocation that is comparable to the private
equilibrium. Then we show that in this socially efficient allocation, the level of public
good is higher than in the equilibrium, when agents’ budget constraints are not
binding.
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium allocation in terms of its loca-
tion in the space of utilities.
Lemma 3. In the equilibrium the vector of agents’ utilities v∗ = (V ∗1 , . . . , V ∗n ) is a
multiple of the diagonal of matrix B:
v∗ = γb
where b = diag(B) and constant γ > 0.
Proof. From the first order condition (7) we know that
n∑
j=1
Bijxj = Bii
v(Y )
v′(Y )
.
14
Substituting that expression into (4) we get
Vi(xi, Y ) =
n∑
j=1
Bijv(Y )xj = Bii
v(Y )2
v′(Y )
.
Factor v(Y )2/v′(Y ) depends only on the Y and is the same for all agents. Thus vector
of utilities v∗ = (V ∗1 , . . . , V ∗n ) is a multiple of the vector of the diagonal elements of
matrix B. 
According to Corollary 3 the equilibrium vector of agents’ utilities v∗ is a multiple
of the vector of matrix B’s diagonal b. First, let us find all allocations x such that
the vector of agent utilities v(x) is parallel to v∗:
v ≡ v(Y )Bx = γb,
solving this system of linear equations with respect to x we get
xi =
γ
v(Y )
χi.
Now assuming that an agent’s budget constraint is not binding (xi ≥ 1) we find
a condition on any allocation x such that v = γb. Summation over i gives us
γ(Y ) = v(Y )(W − Y )/∑χj , using it in the expression above we have
xi =
W − Y∑
χj
χi.
The allocations x we obtain by changing (W − Y ) from 0 to W correspond to points
in the space of utilities belonging to a ray starting at the origin passing through v∗.
Among them there is a Pareto efficient allocation xˆ such that corresponding v(xˆ) is
the point where the ray intersects with the utility-possibility frontier. This allocation
must correspond to x with maximum γ(Y ), hence for such allocation
dγ
dY
= v′(Y )(W − Y )− v(Y ) = 0,
from which we find the socially optimal level of public good in our model8
Yˆ =
1
1/(n) + 1/n
, (12)
and corresponding xˆ is
xˆi =
W − Yˆ∑
χj
χi.
Comparing the equilibrium allocation xˆ∗ with xˆi allows us to state our,
8The Samuelson’s condition for the egoistic society would result to the same expression for Yˆ .
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Proposition 2. The equilibrium allocation xˆ∗ is not socially efficient: level of public
good in equilibrium is lower than socially optimal level of public good.
Proof. Assume that for any i, allocation xˆi defined above is such that 0 < xˆi < 1.
Notice that the socially optimal level of public good, Yˆ , is higher than the equilibrium
provision of public good Y ∗
Yˆ =
1
1/(n) + 1/n
> Y ∗ =
1
χ¯/+ 1/n
where we use the fact that χ¯ > 1/n, because in equilibrium an agent’s marginal rates
of substitution is equal to χi and according to Lemma 2 the sum of marginal rates of
substitution is larger than 1. The lower is the value of χ¯, the closer is the equilibrium
allocation x∗ to the utility-possibility frontier.
Let us verify that in this Pareto efficient allocation xˆ the agents’ budget constraints
are not binding. Notice that for any agent i, xˆi < x
∗
i :
xˆi =
W − Yˆ∑
χj
χi < x
∗
i =
W − Y ∗∑
χj
χi < 1,
because Yˆ > Y ∗ and under condition of the Proposition 1, the budget constraints
are not binding (0 < x∗i < 1). This justifies our assumption that xˆi < 1 made earlier,
therefore equation (12) correctly defines the socially optimal level of public good. 
Summing up the results concerning efficiency of the private equilibrium we may
state that social network encourages agents’ investment in public good, yet the equi-
librium level of public good falls short of the socially optimal level.
4.2 Network structure and public good: importance of
bridging ties
Although for any agent the ‘global’ positive effect of social network on the provision
of public good always dominates the negative ‘local’ effect, the balance between the
two depends on the position that the agent occupies in the network. The equilib-
rium vector of consumption of private good x∗ depends on the diagonal elements of
matrix B. The intensity of return spillovers Bii depends on the size of i’s extended
network (number of neighbours, neighbours of neighbours and so on discounted by
their distance from i), and on the density of connections within this network. The
larger and denser is i’s network the more possibilities are there for ‘circular’ utility
flows and therefore the larger is Bii. The larger is Bii, the more i spends on private
consumption, the less is her contribution to the public good.
Many real world networks have “small-world” modular structure: they consist
of tightly-knit clusters (communities) of nodes with only a few connections running
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between the clusters.9 Within a densely connected cluster there are multiple short
paths connecting its members, while there are only few paths running across clusters.
This suggests that the intensity of spillovers within a cluster, which include return
or ‘circular’ spillovers, is relatively high in comparison with the intensity of spillovers
between clusters. Thus, other things being equal, for an individual in a cluster whose
connections are local, i.e. within the cluster, the trade-off between global public
good and local public good is biased towards the latter. This is because she is not
internalizing positive externalities of her investment in the public good from outside
her cluster. By contrary, an individual whose connections span many clusters may
get more benefits from investing in global public good, because she is exposed to
inter-cluster utility flows.
(a) Social network
B
C
C
C
B
C
C
C
B
C
C
C
A
(b) Matrix B
Figure 1: An example of a modular social network. All links has the same strength
α = 0.23. Left: Social network, Right: Matrix B = (I − A)−1. Shading corresponds to
the magnitude of Bij . Nodes sorted by clusters (individual A is in the first row/column,
individuals B are in rows/columns 2,6, and 13.
To illustrate this point consider a network depicted in Figure 1a. The network
consists of three fully connected clusters and one individual (type A) connected to
each of the clusters through one member of the cluster (type B). All links have the
same strength and high intensity of spilllovers α = 0.23, the value of the parameter 
in the CRRA ego-utility function is set at 0.8, so that the conditions of the Proposition
1 are satisfied.10 The values of χi, diagonal elements Bii, and agent’s contribution to
public good yi, for the three types of nodes in this network are reported in Table 1.
According to the typology of brokerage roles in social network analysis (Gould and
9In social networks those clusters may correspond to members of the same family, same neighbourhood,
close circles of colleagues, or same leader’s constituency etc. For example, Arora and Sanditov (2009)
studied social networks of farmers in a village in Southern India and found that clusters of farmers in this
network are formed around cluster leaders most of whom are important persons in the village.
10The lower is the value of α, the shorter is the effective distance across which utility spillovers flow and
consequently the lower is the importance of agent A bridging the three clusters.
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Fernandez, 1989), the agent in the centre (type A) is a ‘liaison broker’ because she
bridges otherwise disconnected agents (type B) belonging to different clusters. An
agent of type B is a ‘gatekeeper’ because she connects other members of her group
(type C) to the outside world, across a structural hole (Burt, 2000). Agents of type
C do not fill any structural hole and play no brokerage roles in this network.
Table 1: Values of χi, Bii, and contributions to public good, yi, for the three types of
agents in a network shown in Figure 1.
χi Bii yi Brokerage role
A 0.21 1.29 0.49 Liason
B 0.26 1.55 0.39 Gatekeeper
C 0.42 1.44 0.02 –
An individual of type C has no direct inter-cluster ties, hence investment in global
public good for her is less attractive than investment in private (local public) good,
as she receives only limited benefits from the related increase in payoffs of individuals
outside her cluster (low values of Bij outside blocks in Figure 1b). Therefore in
comparison with the others, individuals of type C contribute the least to global public
good compared to the other individuals (Table 1).
Consider the liaison broker at the centre of the network (type A). Her ego-network
has the same size as networks of individuals of type C (each having three direct
neighbours), but A’s network is extremely sparse – there are no connections running
between the three of her neighbours. Although A is positioned outside of any cluster,
her ego-network spans across all of them. In contrast to individuals of type C, her
balance is in favour of investing more in global public good, because the intensity of
spillovers from all other agents Bij is not negligible (first row of matrix B as shown
in Figure 1b), while the intensity of return or ‘circular’ spillovers Bii is relatively low.
An individual of type B belongs to a cluster but has one external tie (with agent
A). This tie exposes her to utility flows from ‘outside world’ and gives her more
incentives to invest in global public good vis-a`-vis individuals C. At the same time
being a part of a tightly connected cluster, an individual B also enjoys higher intensity
of return spillovers (unlike A who has the lowest Bii). In addition, B’s ego-network
is larger than networks of any individual of other type. As a result, with respect
to global public good an individual of type B contributes more to the production of
public good than individuals C, but less than individual A.
With respect to overall production of global public good (therefore social effi-
ciency), having agents like individual A in the social network shown in Figure 1 is
important for two reasons. First, as discussed above, such agents tend to contribute
more to (global) public good than agents with similar number of connections but
whose connections are only local (agents of type C). Second, by bridging otherwise
disconnected clusters, they let utility flows spill over cluster boundaries, allowing
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other agents to internalize part of the positive externalities from their investment in
global public good and therefore encouraging the production of the public good.
The literature on social capital distinguishes between ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’
social capital. Bonding social capital is associated with relationships in close-knit
networks, i.e. in networks where individuals know each other such as families, close
circles of colleagues etc. By contrast, ‘bridging’ capital involves ‘cross-cutting ties’
linking together groups of individuals otherwise distant or disconnected (Burt, 2000).
In the context of our discussion a bonding link refers to a social relationship within a
tightly knit group of individuals, while a bridging link is a social tie that cuts across
such groups. In the social network shown in Figure 1a, ties between agents of type
C and ties between agents of type B and C are bonding ties, while the ties involving
agent A are bridging ties.
The results of our model suggest that, other things being equal, bridging ties
stimulate investment in (global) public good, while bonding ties tend to encourage
private consumption (local public good). In a generic network, however, the effect
of adding a tie largely depends on various characteristics of the positions of agents
connected by the tie. As a consequence, singling out the effect of bridging/bonding
tie on global public good is no trivial task. Nevertheless the effect becomes salient
on locally-dense regular network structures. As an example consider the network
shown in Figure 2a. In this network, agents are placed on a circle at locations
indexed 1, 2, . . . , n. An agent is connected to k closest neighbours on each side and
all connections are of the same strength α, hence the degree of a node in this network
is equal to 2k.
Let us place a tie between two agents who are not connected (e.g. shown by a
dashed line at Figure 2a).11 A tie placed between agents located close to each other
on the circle corresponds to a bonding tie because the network is locally dense and
has many alternative paths running between closely located agents (as is likely in
cases where agents belong to the same tightly-knit community). On the other hand,
a tie between agents located at the opposite sides of the circle is more of a bridging tie
– such agents belong to different communities that are distant from each other. Thus
varying the distance between agents connected by the newly added tie, we obtain a
spectrum of bonding/bridging ties.
Before proceeding to the effect of bonding/bridging social capital, notice that
in accordance with Lemma 1 the larger the value of α, the stronger must be the
effect of the social network on public good provision for both bridging and bonding
ties. Figure 2b reports on change in the provision of (global) public good due to the
addition of a new link, ∆Y , as a function of the strength of social relationships α for
the ties placed between agents at the distance d =3, 5 and 7. As expected, ∆Y is an
increasing function of α.
11The value of α must be lower than 1/(2k + 1) for matrix (I−A) to be dominant diagonal.
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(a) Regular lattice with a shortcut (b) Effect of the strength of social ties
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(c) Effect of shortcut distance on the provision of the public
good on a regular lattice
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Figure 2: The effect of a bridging tie ( = 0.8). a: Regular lattice of 15 agents and 30
links with a shortcut placed between agent 1 and agent 7 (dash line). All links has same
strength α. b: The change in the provision of public good due to a shortcut ∆Y as a
function of the strength of social relationships α for shortcuts at distance 3,5, and 7. c:
The change in the provision of the public good due to a shortcut ∆Y as a function of
shortcut distance d for several values of α
The panel chart in Figure 2c shows the effect of the shortcut distance, d, on the
change in provision of the global public good corresponding to the addition of a new
tie, ∆Y . As one can see, the longer is the shortcut distance, the more resources
are spent on production of public good. This result suggests that, other things
being equal, a bridging tie that brings together agents from distant communities has
stronger effect on private provision of (global) public good than a bonding tie does
and this, in fact, holds for any value of α ∈ (0, 1/(2k + 1)).
Notice that 1-D lattice networks such as the one shown in Figure 2a are specific in-
stances of “small-world” networks of the Watts-Strogatz model (Watts and Strogatz,
1998). In this model, each link in a regular lattice is ‘rewired’ with a given probability
p: if value of p is small, then the resulting network is similar to the original regular
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(a) Watts-Strogatz “small-world” networks
p = 0 p = 0.1 p = 1
Increasing randomness
(b) Effect of shortcut distance on the provision of the public
good in “small-world” networks
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Figure 3: The effect of a bridging tie in Watts-Strogatz “small-world” networks for p =0,
0.1 and 1 and α =0.01 and 0.05. Top: Watts-Strogatz “small-world” networks. Bottom:
Box-and-whisker plot of ∆Y as a function of shortcut distance d in “small-world” networks
(500 simulation runs for each α,p, and d)
network hence its local structure is rich in bonding ties. In contrast, if the probability
of rewiring p is high the local structure disappears and the resulting network structure
becomes similar to Erdos-Renyi random graph where most connections are bridging
ties. In this family of networks ranging from a regular network to a random graph
p serves as an index of randomness (see Figure 3a). Using Monte-Carlo simulations
we can examine how the effect of the shortcut distance on provision of public good
depends on the randomness (hence local structure) of the network.
Figure 3b presents a panel chart with the results of numerical experiment for two
values of α = 0.01 and 0.05 and three values of rewiring probability p = 0, 0.1 and
1.12 The left-most column of the panel corresponds to p = 0 which is the regular 1-D
12From the population of random small-world networks we sample only networks satisfying two sets of
conditions: they produce dominant diagonal matrices (I−A) and they meet the conditions of Proposition
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lattice and the same as the diagrams in the top row of Figure 2c. In locally dense
regular networks saturated with bonding links a bridging social tie has larger effect
than a bonding tie. This also holds true for moderately rewired networks (p = 0.1).
However as the local network structure becomes less pronounced the effect of the
shortcut distance vanishes (right column, p = 1).
5 Conclusions
What does our model say with respect to the two economic contexts mentioned in
the introduction to this paper? The first and obvious conclusion is that networks
of mutual care and reciprocity may help to mitigate the classical problem of under-
provision of public good. An early author on social capital wrote: “The individual
is helpless socially, if left entirely to himself. [. . . ] If he may come into contact
with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of
social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear
a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in
the whole community.” (Hanifan, 1916, p.130) In our model it is the network of
social relationships that helps an individual to appreciate the fact that a personal
contribution to the provision of a public good can make not only a direct difference
for herself, but also her action has an effect on the whole community which pays back
in terms of increased well-being of the others for whom she cares.
The model, however, is overly simple to account in full for the complex dynamic
relationships between individual action and social capital. While social capital is
often used in the implementation of community-level development projects, it is also
simultaneously built as it is used, not least through the establishment of community
public services (cf. Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000). In addition to being an attribute of a
community as a whole (for example, in the form of generalized trust), social capital
has also been argued to be an attribute of individuals (Bourdieu, 1986; Portes, 2000;
Paldam, 2005). The latter is observable as the “ability of people to cooperate vol-
untarily” (Portes, 2000, p.2), or as the “size” or structure of an individuals network
ties (Burt, 2000; Bourdieu, 1986, p.249). It is then reasonable to believe that the two
types of social capital (at the level of a community as a whole and at the individ-
ual level) are complementary and mutually reinforcing. For instance, by cooperating
voluntarily with each other, individuals may build generalized trust in their commu-
nity which may in turn nurture voluntary cooperation between individual community
members. Thus the effect of social network is likely to be much stronger than what
our model may have predicted.
In the context of innovation networks it is widely accepted that R&D collaboration
1. With larger values of α Monte-Carlo simulations become impractical because most randomly generated
networks fail those conditions.
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networks between organizations are an important mechanism by which new technolog-
ical knowledge diffuses through modern economies. This belief is also largely shared
by policy makers, for instance, European Framework Programmes for research and
technological development have devoted significant attention to policy instruments for
encouraging and strengthening R&D networks within the European Research Area.
The results of our model suggest that R&D networks do not only serve as mecha-
nisms for knowledge diffusion, R&D networks may also create additional incentives
(e.g. through ‘circular’ spillovers) to contribute to the production of ‘global’ knowl-
edge relevant to all R&D players as opposed to producing ‘local’ knowledge which is
relevant only to the firm and its closest neighbours.
Another result from the model with respect to the overall level of investment in
public goods is that not only does having social ties between agents matters, but
also important is the knowledge of who these ties actually connect. Our discussion of
modular small-world type networks suggests that a ‘cohesive’ network structure rich
in social ties spanning across families, neighbourhoods, and circles of close friends can
do better than a ‘segmented’ network structure where links are local to homogeneous
groups. In the latter segmented network structure, an individual finds that invest-
ment in a local public good, which benefits the individual and members of her close
social circle, brings larger returns than investment in a global public good that bene-
fits all individuals in the entire network indiscriminately. In contrast, in a ‘cohesive’
network structure an individual would be more willing to invest in a global public
good because a social network spanning different clusters allows her to observe that
investment in global public good can make a difference for other individuals in her
wider network beyond the circle of her family and close friends (without producing
any detrimental effects). This result seems to be in line with some empirical evi-
dence on community-based development projects which finds difference in the effect
of ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ social capital in the establishment of public services (e.g.
Motiram and Osberg, 2010).
With respect to R&D networks, this result implies that the impact of policies
to encourage R&D collaborations will depend on how policy-induced connections
fit into the pre-existing structure of knowledge networks. Much work in economic
and management literature on innovation networks emphasises the importance of
long-distance ties, particularly for more substantial non-incremental innovations (e.g.
Burt, 2000; Cowan and Jonard, 2003; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Cowan and Jonard, 2007).
By bridging otherwise distant parts of social and innovation networks, inter-cluster
connections may foster information exchange, maintain diversity of knowledge and
enhance individual creativity. Our model offers a different (and complementary)
rationale for higher efficiency of network structures with inter-cluster bridging links:
in a network with diverse ties, agents (individuals, firms, regions) have more incentives
to invest in a ‘global’ public good because the network allows them to internalize
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larger part of positive externalities resulting from such investment. Thus policies
to encourage collaborations within densely connected clusters (e.g. between firms
within the same region) might end up stimulating an agent to invest in ‘local’ type
of knowledge beneficial to the agent and its closest network neighbours. Such a sub-
optimal outcome may be countered by promoting the formation and strengthening
of inter-cluster connections that stimulate agents’ investment in the production of
less specific, general knowledge. Alternatively, to encourage the production of such
‘global’ knowledge, policy makers may be better off promoting innovation in existing
R&D networks that are sparsely connected.
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